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ABSTRACT
We develop a new approach to measuring changes in consumer welfare due to changes in the price
of owner-occupied housing. In our approach, an agent's welfare adjustment is defined as the transfer
required to keep expected discounted utility constant given a change in current home prices. We
demonstrate that, up to a first-order approximation, there is no aggregate change in welfare due to
price increases in the existing housing stock. This follows from a simple market clearing condition
where capital gains experienced by sellers are exactly offset by welfare losses to buyers. Welfare
losses can occur, however, from price increases in new construction and renovations. We show that
this result holds (approximately) even in a model that accounts for changes in consumption and
investment plans prompted by current price changes. We estimate the welfare cost of house price
appreciation to be an average of $127 per household per year over the 1984-1998 period.
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There has been tremendous house price appreciation in the United States during the latter part of the
1990s. At the national level, house prices have risen at an average annual rate of 7 percent since 1995.
Some regions, particularly those with a heavy concentration of high-tech …rms, saw double digit increases in
house prices during the peak of the most recent economic expansion (see Table 1). This price appreciation
signi…cantly strengthened the balance sheets of existing homeowners. A recent study by Canner, Dynan,
and Passmore (2002) estimated that households extracted approximately $130 billion in equity in 2001 and
the …rst half of 2002. On the negative side, however, the 7 percent annual house price appreciation in the
late 1990’s signi…cantly outpaced the growth in per capita income of 2 percent for the nation as a whole over
this time period. Local governments in metropolitan areas with the sharpest price appreciation, such as
Austin, Boston, and San Francisco, routinely cite housing a¤ordability as their principle constraint on future
economic growth. More generally, households in the lower tail of the income distribution are now less able
to a¤ord housing than they were a decade ago. This lack of a¤ordability is troubling to policy makers, as
homeownership is often associated with a variety of positive social outcomes (see Green and White (1997)
and DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999)).
This paper is about the welfare e¤ects of changes in the price of housing. The sheer size of housing in the
average household’s consumption bundle makes it imperative to understand the e¤ects of changing prices on
consumer welfare. Shelter comprises 32% of the total consumer price index (CPI). Owner-occupied housing
is also an asset which occupies a large portion of the typical household’s portfolio. According to the 1998
Survey of Consumer Finances, the value of stocks owned by households was $7.8 trillion, while the value of
primary residences was $9.4 trillion.
To our knowledge, there has been relatively little work on measuring the welfare e¤ects of house price
changes. Most measures of housing a¤ordability are calculated as percentages of a target population with
su¢cient income to a¤ord the median-priced house at the current interest rate. These indexes, however,
are di¢cult to interpret because they abstract away from, amongst other things, household preferences and
household wealth. In addition, a¤ordability indexes display volatility that is inherited from the variables
used in their construction, such as interest rates and prices. By contrast, homeownership rates, the variables
that a¤ordability indexes are supposed to predict, are among the least volatile of the urban economic series
(see Glaeser and Shapiro (2002)).
The body of work most closely related to ours is devoted to developing better measures of the cost of
housing and house price in‡ation. Current practices at the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) re‡ect the
important research of Kearl (1979), Dougherty and Van Order (1982), and Poterba (1984) in this area. In
constructing its owner-occupied shelter index, the BLS aims to measure changes in the user cost, or the fair
rental value of owner-occupied housing. The user cost can be interpreted as the bribe required to compensate
2a household for a unit decrease in housing services, in a given time period, holding asset ownership …xed.
While the user cost is a good measure of the cost of housing services (the intended purpose of the BLS),
there are two reasons that make it unsatisfactory as a measure of the welfare e¤ects of house price changes.
First, the user cost calculation assumes that households can adjust their consumption of housing services
costlessly, and therefore does not account for behavior changes in periods following changes in prices. If
there were no cost to adjusting consumption of housing services, then all consumption adjustments would
occur immediately. However, due to transaction costs, one potential e¤ect of an increase in current housing
prices might be to lead a household to plan to sell its house nine years into the future instead of ten. In our
opinion, such behavior is an important feature of household housing choice, and should be included in the
welfare measure.
A second problem with using the user cost as a welfare measure is that it does not include the e¤ect of
house price changes on household assets. Due to moral hazard problems with rental housing, as well as tax
incentives, households that wish to consume high levels of housing services have strong incentives to also
own the home as an asset. In that case, changes in the relative price of housing impact both sides of the
household’s budget constraint. As a result, households with high levels of housing consumption may be made
better o¤ by realized increases in prices. Similarly, households that intend to increase their consumption of
housing in the future may be made worse o¤ by increases in current house prices.
In this paper, we develop welfare measures using a dynamic model of housing consumption and investment
decisions. In the model, consumers maximize expected discounted utility by choosing investments in housing,
consumption of a composite commodity, and real savings. The household’s current stock of housing and
the current price of housing enter into the decision problem as state variables. We measure the change in
consumer welfare due to changes in house prices as the transfer required to keep lifetime expected utility
constant under the new prices. Thus, we extend the notion of a cost of living adjustment to a dynamic
setting with durable goods, and also include in the welfare calculations the e¤ects of changes in housing
wealth that accompany changes in house prices.
Using this dynamic framework, we derive a simple yet striking result. In our model, to a …rst order
approximation, there are no aggregate welfare e¤ects due to price changes in the current stock of owner-
occupied housing. The intuition behind this result depends on a simple market clearing condition. If the
price of housing goes up, consumers who are selling their houses are made better o¤ while consumers who
are buying those houses are made worse o¤. Since the number of buyers of existing houses must equal the
number of sellers, the welfare bene…ts and losses to each group o¤set. There can, however, be changes in
welfare due to additions to the stock of housing, or to changes in the price of renovating and upgrading the
current stock of housing. Using our model, we construct a measure of aggregate welfare changes from house
price appreciation. Over the period 1984-1998, we …nd that U.S. households were made worse o¤ by an
average of $127 per year.
3The outline of the paper is as follows. First, we develop a simple model of housing consumption and
investment, and derive an expression for the fair rental price of housing—or the user cost. Second, we derive
a welfare adjustment that fully takes into account the dynamics of housing choice. Third, we construct
an aggregate welfare index for housing and illustrate some of its important characteristics. Fourth, we list
some caveats and discuss the limitations to our approach. The …fth section concludes the paper.
2 The user cost of capital
The user cost of capital was …rst developed by Hall and Jorgenson (1967). Their original paper showed how
capital investment depended on tax policy through a marginal condition. The user cost, as they de…ned
it, was the opportunity cost of investing in capital goods. Housing, as a durable good, …ts nicely into the
framework outlined by Hall and Jorgenson, and many authors have exploited the user cost formula to study
housing demand and price dynamics.1 Dougherty and Van Order (hereafter DV) were among the …rst to
recognize that the user cost could be a good measure of in‡ation in the cost of housing services. They note
that the user cost is a marginal rate of substitution of housing consumption for other consumption. Further,
in a competitive economy, the user cost should be equal to the rental price of a single unit of housing services
charged by a pro…t-maximizing landlord. Thus, the inherently di¢cult task of measuring an unobservable
marginal rate of substitution is replaced by the much easier task of measuring rents.
Following the logic in DV, the BLS changed its procedure for measuring in‡ation of housing costs in 1983.
The BLS currently measures changes in the cost of owner-occupied units by constructing a rental price index
(the owners’ equivalent rent index). The BLS forms a sample of 36,000 owners for two year intervals and
queries owners about the implicit rental value of their house and which housing services would be included
in this rent. The BLS then measures changes in rental rates for actual rental units and re-weights these
observations to construct the owners’ equivalent rent index.2 This method of measuring housing in‡ation
represented a great improvement over previous methods, which simply measured changes in house prices.
The theoretical underpinnings of the user cost are easy to demonstrate, and also permit us to make a
distinction between simple measures of changes in costs, and changes in welfare. For simplicity and for
comparison with previous work, we begin by assuming that households have no uncertainty about future
prices.3 Consider an economy in which there are two goods, a composite commodity, ct, and a housing
good, ht, with relative price, qt. At each period t = 1;:::;T, households choose how much of the composite
commodity to consume, ct, how many bonds to buy that mature in the following period, bt+1, and what
level of housing consumption to carry into the next period, ht+1. The household’s investment in housing
services is denoted xt. The household has real income yt, and saves (or dissaves) st. The period interest rate
1See Kearl (1979), Poterba (1984) and (1991), DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994), and Crone, Nakamura, and Voith (2000).
2See the BLS website for more detail on constructing rental indices: http://stats.bls.gov/cpifact7.htm.
3The analysis and notation in this section follows that of Dougherty and Van Order (1982).
4on bonds is it. All income is taxed at a constant rate µ. The in‡ation rate for the composite commodity is
constant at ¼. Houses depreciate at constant rate ± per period.
The household maximizes its discounted utility subject to the constraints,
ct + qtxt + st = (1¡ µ)yt + (1¡ µ)itbt; (1)
bt+1 ¡ bt = st ¡ ¼bt; (2)
ht+1 ¡ ht = xt ¡ ±ht: (3)
Equation (1) is the period budget constraint. Real expenditures on consumption, investments in housing,
and real savings must equal total real income. Equation (2) provides the transition law for savings. Each
period, savings is equal to the di¤erence in bondholdings from the previous period, net of in‡ation. It will
be assumed throughout that households are not credit-constrained. Equation (3) describes the transition law
for housing. Each period, housing investment is equal to the di¤erence between the current stock holdings
and stock holdings from the period before, net of depreciation.
Households maximize discounted utility. Let u(h;c) be the period utility function for this household.
The household’s value function can be written recursively as
Vt(ht;bt;qt;yt) = max
ht+1;bt+1
fu(ht;ct) + ¯Vt+1(ht+1;bt+1;qt+1;yt+1)g (4)
subject to (1)-(3).












where ¢qt = qt ¡ qt¡1.
Equation (5) is the marginal rate of substitution of housing for the composite good with respect to the
period utility function. It represents the user cost of capital in our model. In order to have an extra unit of
housing services at time t, the consumer invests xt¡1 at time t¡1 into the stock of housing. The opportunity
cost of this investment increases as the expected return on time t ¡ 1 savings goes up (as re‡ected by it
and ¡¼) and as the rate of depreciation increases. The opportunity cost falls with the rate of housing
appreciation.
In this model, the user cost of capital is derived as the marginal rate of substitution between housing
and other goods, keeping the period return function constant. DV suggest that this is “...an appropriate
measure of housing cost on the grounds that it is a measure of the dollar value of the bribe necessary to
get home-owners to give up one unit of housing.” While we agree that the user cost is a good measure of
the ‡ow value of the housing asset, changes in the user cost can give a misleading picture of the change in
aggregate welfare due to a change in relative prices. The reason is that the user cost fails to account fully
5for the fact that housing is not merely a consumption good, but is also an investment good that enters into
the household’s portfolio of assets. After an increase in price, households that own their homes will be
better o¤. Indeed, this assumption underpins the empirical literature that looks for changes in consumption
following changes in housing wealth.4 Similarly, renters who eventually plan to buy are made worse o¤ by
the change in relative prices.
Another confounding problem with the use of a marginal rate of substitution to make a welfare calculation
is the fact that this exercise uses a static approach to measure something that is inherently dynamic in nature.
The user cost is suitable for measuring the dollar value of the bribe necessary to give up one unit of housing
for one period. Or, equivalently, the user cost is the dollar value of the bribe necessary to keep single period
utility constant under di¤erent relative prices. This approach does not take into account expectations for
future values of the state variables in the economy, such as interest rates or other variables that in‡uence
a household’s tenure choice. A more appropriate way to tackle the welfare question is to ask, given the
current state of the economy, what is the dollar value of the bribe necessary to keep lifetime expected utility
constant? Given an expression for this welfare adjustment, it is then possible to aggregate and compute a
welfare index for the economy.
3 A simple dynamic model
The standard de…nition of an exact cost of living adjustment (e.g., Diewert (1976)) is the di¤erence of
expenditure functions in two periods at a constant level of utility, but with changing prices. Our approach
to measuring changes in welfare di¤ers in two crucial ways. First, we focus on dynamics. We keep the value
function—not the period return function—constant. Second, we explicitly recognize that housing is both
an investment and a consumption good. When relative prices change, both the set of feasible purchases as
well as the household’s budget constraint are a¤ected. Formally, our welfare adjustment for period t, which
we denote as wt, is de…ned in equations (6) and (7),
wt = y0
t ¡ yt; such that (6)
Vt(ht;bt;q0
t;y0
t) = Vt(ht;bt;qt;yt); (7)
where Vt is de…ned in equation (4). In this section, we have dynamics, but no uncertainty. Thus, in this
exercise we are studying how lifetime expected utility changes after a price change that lasts a single period.
After this price change, prices revert back to their old level. The welfare adjustment is a dollar value,
expressed as a di¤erence between two income levels y0 and y that makes the household indi¤erent between
relative prices q0
t and qt.
4See Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2001), Englehardt (1996), Hoynes and McFadden (1994).










t ¡ qt and ¢yt = y0
t ¡ yt: (9)













It follows from equations (8)-(11) that if we want to keep discounted expected utility constant (that is,







(1¡ µ)¢yt = xt¢qt: (13)





Equation (14) has a very di¤erent interpretation than equation (5) for computing the welfare adjustment.
If nominal house prices are increasing (¢qt > 0), then the welfare adjustment is positive for those households
that are increasing their stock of housing, and negative for those households that are decreasing their stock
of housing. If a household increases its stock of housing by xt; then the welfare adjustment is the change
in real income needed to a¤ord the increase in prices. If the household is decreasing its stock of housing,
then the welfare adjustment is negative. This makes sense because those households that are decreasing
their stock of housing (i.e., planning to sell) are made better o¤ by price increases. All other things held
equal, welfare adjustments are higher under higher marginal tax rates. This is because of the interest
rate deduction. Finally, a household that makes no change to its housing stock experiences no immediate
change in its welfare. This is one of the most important features of the model—welfare gains and losses are
experienced only when changes in prices alter housing consumption plans. In the next section we extend
this result to cover the cases where changes in prices can alter the path of the economy’s state variables and,
thus, alter consumption plans far into the future.
7Note that our approach di¤ers from the user cost approach, where expected capital gains reduce overall
housing service costs one-to-one in every period, regardless of the timing of consumption plans. In most real
world housing markets, consumers do not buy and sell homes frequently. Holding all else …xed (including
expected future relative prices), changes in the relative price of housing today should leave utility unchanged
for those who do not adjust their housing stock. This idea is re‡ected in equation (14).
3.0.1 Aggregate welfare adjustment
Suppose that there are I households in the economy and that the investment in housing services by household







The aggregate welfare adjustment is the sum of the welfare adjustments in equation (14) for all of the
households in the economy.
In order to characterize the aggregate welfare e¤ect, we make the following simplifying assumption about
the economy:
A1. Investment in housing can be obtained by purchasing existing stock (xo), purchasing new stock (xn),








This assumption is essentially an accounting identity that represents the only way an agent can adjust
his housing consumption.
An important feature of housing markets is that investment in existing stock is accomplished through
trade between owners. Any investment in existing stock by agent iis perfectly o¤set by a sale by some agent




i;t = 0; because ¡ xo
i;t = xo
j;t for all buyer-seller pairs(i;j): (17)
The aggregate welfare adjustment due to changes in prices of the existing housing stock is zero. The
intuition behind this result is straightforward. Suppose that household A sells a home worth $100,000 to
household B. Suppose that, in nominal terms, the price of housing has increased by $5,000 over the past
year. Then, in nominal terms, the welfare adjustment for household A is -$5,000 and the welfare adjustment
for household B is $5,000. The aggregate adjustment is zero. The implication of this result is that any
8aggregate welfare adjustment must come from changes in the housing stock from new construction and/or
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Equation (18) has important consequences for the measurement of welfare. The change in welfare
attributable to a change in relative prices is given by the value of the total investment in new stock plus the
dollar value of the renovations prompted by the change in prices. There may be enormous changes in welfare
for individual households who buy and sell the existing stock, but most of these welfare e¤ects will be o¤set
by equal but opposite welfare e¤ects experienced elsewhere in the economy. Since new construction each
year represents a small fraction of the existing stock in most countries, and renovation costs in any given
year represent a small fraction of the total value of the houses being renovated, basing welfare transfers on
a welfare index such as the CPI will overcompensate a large proportion of the economy.
In Figure 1 we see estimates of Wt for the U.S. data. The new construction series is the historical cost
of privately-owned new residential housing, published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The
renovation series is an historical cost series derived from the …xed asset tables, also published by the BEA.
Since we do not know the actual distribution of tax rates for the population of homeowners, we assume
µ = 0 and interpret the derived series Wt as a lower bound for the actual welfare costs of housing price
changes. The …gure shows a series trending upwards as house prices have risen over time. Negative year-
over-year growth rates in the welfare index tend to track the U.S. real estate cycle, with declines in the index
mainly representing declines in new construction. Between 1984 and 1998, the average amount required to
compensate households for changes in house prices was $127.
3.1 Generalizations
A simplifying assumption made in the previous section was that changes in house prices today convey no
information about the house prices in the future. In this section we allow for a richer model where changes
in the current price convey information about the evolution of prices in the future.
We now assume that house prices follow a Markov Chain, Fq(qt+1jqt). We also assume that income, inter-
est rates, and in‡ation follow Markov chains Fy(yt+1jyt); Fi(it+1jit); and F¼(¼t+1j¼t); and that a household
lives for T periods.5 Finally, we assume that there is a …xed cost, f, for adjusting the stock of housing if
xt 6= 0. We let 1fxt 6= 0g denote the indicator function for the event that the stock of housing services has
5For simplicity, we assume that these processes are independent. However, it would not greatly complicate things to allow
them to be dependent.
9been adjusted. This last assumption alters the budget constraint to
ct + qtxt + f1fxt 6= 0g+ st = (1¡ µ)yt + (1¡ µ)itbt: (19)
To simplify notation, we gather the state variables into a state vector !t = (ht;bt;qt;yt;it;¼t) and de…ne
G(!tj!t¡1) to be the Markov chain describing the evolution of the entire state vector. The household’s









subject to (19), (2), and (3). (21)
Now consider a price level change from qt = q0 to qt = q00. We de…ne the dynamic welfare adjustment in a
similar way to the last section. It is the transfer (in real terms) necessary to keep the value function constant.
Intuitively, welfare adjustments in a dynamic setting will come from three di¤erent sources. First, changes
in prices may change planned expenditures on housing. Even if households do not change their housing
investment plans after a change in prices, their future planned expenditures are likely to be di¤erent. This
e¤ect can be thought of as an income e¤ect. Second, changes in prices may alter savings decisions. Price
increases make existing owners more wealthy, possibly causing them to reduce their savings and increase
consumption. Third, changes in relative prices can cause households to substitute between housing and the
consumption good. This e¤ect can be likened to a substitution e¤ect. Our dynamic welfare adjustment has
three terms that re‡ect all of the di¤erent ways that households can alter their behavior following a change








s((E [qt+sxt+sjqt = q00] ¡ E [qt+sxt+sjqt = q0]) (22)











s¡r (E [xt+rjqt = q00] ¡ E [xt+rjqt = q0])):






s (E [qt+sxt+sjqt = q00] ¡ E [qt+sxt+sjqt = q0])
illustrates, once again, that households that adjust housing consumption (i.e., xt+s for some s) after relative
price changes will experience changes in their welfare. This welfare adjustment is the after tax discounted
expected value of the di¤erence between the planned expenditures on housing consumption under the two
di¤erent relative price levels. We emphasize that the sequence of planned housing investments in the equation
above re‡ects optimal decision-making given existing prices (either q0 or q00). Households that keep housing
10consumption constant over their lifetimes do not directly bene…t (or lose) from price changes. Any direct
bene…t (loss) from price changes comes from an eventual purchase or sale, and is discounted to the present.
It is possible that households experience an indirect change in their welfare even if they do not change






s (E [st+s ¡ (1 ¡ µ)it+sbt+sjqt = q
00] ¡ E [st+s ¡ (1¡ µ)it+sbt+sjqt = q
0])
which represents the after-tax expected discounted value of the di¤erence in planned real savings under the
two di¤erent relative price levels. If relative prices increase (decrease) it may be optimal for the household
to lower (raise) its savings rate to account for the change in wealth that has just occurred. The exact
adjustment to optimal savings plans depends on the household’s preferences. Impatient and less risk averse
households will generally reduce their savings following an increase in prices, while risk averse households












s¡r (E[xt+rjqt = q
00] ¡ E [xt+rjqt = q
0]);
represents the change in discounted utility that results from changes in consumption of housing services due
to the price change. For example, if relative prices increase, it may be optimal for the household to reduce
its housing consumption. The third term measures the utility e¤ect of this change, discounted to the present.
As before, the exact amount of this adjustment will depend on household preferences, as is evidenced by
the
®1
®2 term, which is the marginal rate of substitution of housing consumption for nonhousing consumption
(see appendix for the derivation). Note that this term is di¤erent from the …rst term, which measured the
di¤erences in cost associated with optimal housing investment under two di¤erent prices. This term only
becomes important if changes in the relative price of housing cause a substitution e¤ect.
There is some debate in the literature on the magnitude of the elasticity of savings with respect to housing
prices. Englehardt (1996) argues that this elasticity is small, while Hoynes and McFadden (1994) …nd that
households adjust savings in an asymmetric way, increasing savings slightly when house prices decline, but
leaving their savings rates unaltered after price increases. While this issue is not completely resolved (see
Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2001)) we use this evidence as justi…cation for ignoring the second term, which
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s¡r (E [xt+rjqt = q
00]¡ E[xt+rjqt = q
0])): (23)
113.1.1 The aggregate welfare adjustment
As before, we de…ne the aggregate welfare adjustment (Wt) as the sum of the welfare adjustments for the
individual households. Suppose that credit markets clear and that supply must equal demand in the market
where existing homes are traded. Then, the main result of the previous section holds approximately in the
general case. That is, it is approximately true that any aggregate change in welfare can only be due to
changes in the price of new housing and changes to the housing stock. This is because the e¤ects of price
changes for the existing housing stock on the cost of living of both buyers and sellers are still o¤setting.
In the …rst term of (23), it is easy to see that price changes for the existing stock of housing exactly o¤set.
The same is true for the second term if all individuals have the same marginal rate of substitution between
housing consumption and consumption of the composite commodity (®1










































If it is not the case that all individuals have the same marginal rates of substitution, then (24) holds
approximately so long as the housing stock does not shift among households in any systematic way.7
In this more general setting, agents that sell their houses when prices increase realize a capital gain. Thus,
the dynamic welfare adjustment does bear a resemblance to the traditional user cost. However, unlike the
user cost, agents do not necessarily experience changes in welfare because of the event that house prices have
increased. These capital gains-related changes in welfare are realized only to the extent that they in‡uence
some eventual sale. The impact of the …nal sale on equation (23) depends on how distant in time the sale is
expected to be.
For households trading within the set of existing housing stock, the aggregate impact on welfare is
approximately zero. Welfare adjustments are approximately o¤set among current and future buyers and
sellers. Note that price changes may have a large distributional impact. Households that own their housing
are bene…ted by price increases at the expense of those that do not yet own their housing.
6Note that, in principle, this could involve trades between households that are alive today and households that have not
been born by the current period.
7For example, if households with low marginal rates of substitution increased their housing stock relative to those with high
marginal rates of substitution as a result of a price change, then this term would include some e¤ect of prices on the existing
stock of housing.
124 Caveats and extensions
In this section we discuss some of the limitations of our modeling framework and how they might bias our
results. One important simplifying assumption is that credit constraints are not binding. Credit constraints
may bind for some individuals in many local real estate markets. More importantly, young households
looking to transition from rental markets to the owner-occupied market are probably the most likely to
face binding constraints. A rapid increase in prices may force some of these households out of the market
for owner-occupied housing because they lack the necessary resources to qualify for a mortgage or to come
up with a downpayment.8 While we do not attempt to measure the overall welfare loss due to binding
credit constraints — doing so would require a su¢ciently more complex model — we believe that our current
approach leads us to understate the overall change in welfare due to price increases in the aggregate. Clearly,
this is an important area for future research.
A second important simplifying assumption we make is in equation (8), in which we use a …rst order
approximation to the value function when computing the welfare adjustment. While this is probably an
innocuous assumption for small changes in home prices, it is not innocuous when price changes are large. If
households are facingcredit constraints, then large increases in prices may prevent the constrained households
from investing xt in new housing. Additionally, we may expect a substitution e¤ect to take place if there are
dramatic changes in relative prices. Using a …rst order approximation also allows us to abstract away from
risk in our calculations. If we wanted to allow for risk, we could instead use a second order Taylor series.
Many of the results could easily be restated for this case, but at the cost of much more notation.
A third important point is that we abstract away from mortgages. Instead we assume that individuals
borrow on the bond market in order to purchase housing. Adding mortgages and the choice of …nancing
packages into our analysis would greatly complicate the model with, in our opinion, little to gain.
A …nal and important caveat is that, while price changes do not result in aggregate changes in the welfare
in the existing stock of housing, this is far from true at a disaggregated level. Individual households moving
into an area after an episode of rapidly increasing prices have to pay more for their houses. Housing in‡ation
involves a redistribution of income between those buying homes and those selling their homes. While there
is no aggregate change in welfare, there are potentially large individual losses and gains in welfare.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we develop an alternative approach to measuring changes in the cost of housing services. Using
a simple model of rational forward looking agents, we develop a cost of living, or welfare adjustment, to
8Typically, mortgages are priced nonlinearly, with a large discrete jump in interest rates for loans with downpayments below
a certain level.
13compensate households for changes in housing prices. The welfare adjustment is de…ned as the amount of
the consumption good necessary to keep a household’s value function constant after a change in prices. Our
welfare adjustment has an important property when aggregated across all individuals in the economy. We
show that the only changes in aggregate welfare due to house price changes come from new construction and
renovation of the existing stock. By far the large majority of the housing transactions in the United States
involve existing stock. As a result, over the period 1984-1998, the average welfare loss per household due to
house price changes was only $127 per year.
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166 Derivation of the Cost of Living Adjustment for General Model
Linearizing the utility function by using a …rst order Taylor approximation around (h0;c0), we write utility
as:
u(h;c) = u(h0;c0) +
@u
@h
(h0;c0)(h ¡ h0) +
@u
@c
(h0;c0)(c ¡ c0) (25)
= ®o + ®1h + ®2c
= ®o + ®1h + ®2 ((1 ¡ µ)yt + (1¡ µ)itbt ¡ st ¡ qtxt ¡ f1fxt 6= 0g);









(®o + ®1ht+s + ®2[(1 ¡ µ)yt+s + (1¡ µ)it+sbt+s
¡st+s ¡ qt+sxt+s ¡ f1fxt+s 6= 0g](f (¡ ! ! t;sjqt = q
00) ¡ f (¡ ! ! t;sjqt = q
0)) d¡ ! ! t;s: (26)
Because ®o is a constant and it is multiplied by the di¤erence between two densities, it drops out of the
equation. Because yt evolves independently of the other state variables, it also drops out of the equation.
We also assume that the household is not exactly on the boundary between investing and not investing and
that the housing price change is small enough that the household does not move from zero housing investment
to nonzero investment. Thus, the …xed cost term also drops out of the equation. We also recognize that,




















s¡r xt+r + ®2 ((1 ¡ µ)it+sbt+s ¡ st+s) (27)







s®2 (E [(1¡ µ)it+sbt+s ¡ st+sjqt = q





















s¡r xt+rjqt = q0]
¡®2 (E [qt+sxt+sjqt = q
00]¡ E [qt+sxt+sjqt = q
0])):
Up to a …rst order approximation, giving a household a temporary increase in income of ¢yt changes the
value function as follows:
17¢Vt
¢yt
¢yt = ®2(1¡ µ)¢yt (29)







s(E [st+s ¡ (1 ¡ µ)it+sbt+sjqt = q

















s¡r xt+rjqt = q0
#
+(E [qt+sxt+sjqt = q00] ¡ E [qt+sxt+sjqt = q0])): (30)
18A Tables and Graphs
Table 1: Annualized House Price Changes for Select Metropolitan Areas
1980-1990 1990-2000 1995-2000
Chicago 6% 4% 5%
Los Angeles 8% 1% 5%
New York 11% 3% 7%
Phoenix 2% 5% 6%
San Francisco 9% 5% 12%
Source: Oﬃce of Federal Housing Enterprise OversightFigure 1: Yearly Fall in Per Household Welfare
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